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Forty-six percent of US imports occur 
between related parties. This aggregate statis-
tic, however, obscures considerable variation 
in intrafirm intensity across import partners as 
well as products. Indeed, while 74 percent of US 
imports from Japan are intrafirm, the figure for 
Bangladesh is just two percent. Likewise, trade 
between related parties accounted for two per-
cent of US imports of rubber and plastic foot-
wear, but more than 70 percent of US imports 
of autos, medical equipment, and instruments. 
There is also significant variation in intrafirm 
intensity across countries within products. Photo 
Films, Plates and Chemicals (North American 
Industry Classification System 325992), for 
example, ranks fifth overall in terms of the 
share of intrafirm trade, but half of the countries 
from which it is sourced (by value) exported it 
to the United States almost completely at arm’s 
length.1
1 A longer version of this paper, Bernard, Jensen, 
Redding, and Schott (forthcoming), contains additional 
results and is available on the AER Web site (http://www.
aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.2.487) and 
from the authors.
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These figures highlight the importance of 
product and country characteristics—and 
 especially their interaction—in explaining 
intrafirm trade. Such factors are emphasized in 
recent theoretical models of multinational firms 
that stress the role of contracting in firms’ deci-
sions both to source components in-house versus 
at arm’s length and to locate production at home 
versus abroad.2 These models differ from earlier 
theories of multinationals in their emphasis on 
the costs associated with writing contracts for 
specialized inputs and the attention they pay to 
traded intermediate goods.
Guided by these models, we examine the 
product and country determinants of intrafirm 
trade.3 In particular, we introduce a new mea-
sure of products’ revealed contractibility based 
on the idea that contracting likely is easier for 
products passing through intermediaries such as 
wholesalers. We find that both this measure and 
countries’ governance quality are associated 
with variation in intrafirm trade in interesting 
and intuitive ways, and that factors associated 
with engaging in related-party trade differ from 
those associated with the intensity of intrafirm 
trade once a link is established. Higher qual-
ity country governance, for example, is associ-
ated with a higher probability of related-party 
trade taking place. Further increases in quality, 
however, coincide with lower shares of related-
party trade, presumably due to the greater ease 
with which arm’s length contracts can be writ-
ten. With respect to interactions of product and 
country attributes, improvements in country 
governance lead to the largest reductions in 
intrafirm trade in low contractibility products.
2 See, for example, Pol Antràs (2003), Antràs and 
Elhanan Helpman (2004), and Gene M. Grossman and 
Helpman (2005).
3 Our findings complement existing empirical exami-
nations of intrafirm trade by Gregory Corcos, Delphine 
Irac, Giordano Mion, and Thierry Verdier (2008), Fabrice 
Defever and Farid Toubal (2007), Nathan Nunn and Daniel 
Trefler (2008) and Stephen R. Yeaple (2006).
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I. Data
We use the US Linked/Longitudinal Firm 
Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which 
links individual US trade transactions to US 
firms.4 Import transactions take place between 
related parties if either party owns, directly or 
indirectly, six percent or more of the other party. 
To align Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
production and HS trade data, and to expand the 
sample of countries on which data on country 
characteristics are available, we focus on the 
year 1997.
To explore the role of various country char-
acteristics discussed below, we combine these 
trade data with measures of physical capital 
abundance, human capital abundance, and 
population from Robert E. Hall and Charles I. 
Jones (1999), a composite index of countries’ 
governance quality from the World Bank, and 
measures of trade and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) protection from Heritage Foundation/
WSJ (2006).5 We measure products’ capital 
and skill intensity using data from the 1997 US 
Census of Manufactures. We assign all ten-digit 
HS products within a particular four-digit SIC 
industry the average capital or skill (nonproduc-
tion workers as a share of employment) intensity 
of all plants whose output is concentrated in that 
industry. Industry headquarters intensity is mea-
sured by the average share of firm employment 
at headquarters and auxiliary establishments.6
We assume that products passing through 
intermediaries are the easiest over which to con-
tract. As a result, we measure products’ revealed 
contractibility as the weighted average whole-
sale employment share of firms importing the 
product, using firms’ import value as weights,
(1)    IMEdp  =  ∑ 
f
  
 
 
Wf
 _____ 
EMPf
   
Mpf
 ___ 
Mp
  .
4 See Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) for more 
details.
5 We use factor analysis to create a univariate measure 
of country governance for 1996 from the six World Bank 
measures reported by Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and 
Massimo Mastruzzi (2006). The first factor upon which we 
focus accounts for around 90 percent of the variance of the 
six measures.
6 For further discussion of the data definitions and 
sources, see Bernard et al. (2010).
The first term in the intermediation measure 
is the share of wholesale employment (Wf ) 
in firm f  ’s total employment (EMPf ).7 The 
second term is the import share of firm f in 
ten-digit HS product market p, with Mpf and 
Mp representing firm f  ’s imports of product 
p and total US imports of product p, respec-
tively. Intermediation ranges between zero and 
unity:  if no firms importing product p have 
any wholesale establishments, IMEdp = 0. On 
the other hand, if product p is imported exclu-
sively by firms with 100 percent employment in 
wholesaling, IMEdp = 1.
Intermediation and intrafirm import shares 
are inversely related across two-digit HS cat-
egories, as shown in Figure 1. There is, how-
ever, substantial independent variation in the 
two variables, as industries with similar lev-
els of intermediation span a wide range of 
intrafirm intensity. Footwear (HS 64) and 
Organic Chemicals (HS 29), for example, have 
comparable levels of intermediation, 0.135 and 
0.136 respectively. However, more than half of 
Organic Chemicals imports are conducted by 
related parties, while the intrafirm trade share 
for Footwear is less than ten percent.
II.  Determinants of Intrafirm Trade
Our empirical analysis uses cross-sectional 
data on intrafirm and total US imports of prod-
uct p from country c in 1997. Our empirical 
 specification regresses measures of intrafirm 
trade (IFpc ) on product characteristics (Xp ), 
country characteristics (Zc ), and interactions 
between product and country characteristics (Xp × Zc ):
(2)   IFpc  = θ + αXp + βZc + γ (Xp Zc) + ϵpc .
We consider two measures of intrafirm trade: 
the share of intrafirm imports in US imports, 
which we refer to as the “intensive” margin, 
and a dummy variable which is equal to one if 
there are positive intrafirm imports for a prod-
uct and country, which we call the “extensive” 
7 We observe employment and major industry at the 
establishment level. We assign all employees in an estab-
lishment to the major industry of that establishment. Firms 
with a single establishment necessarily have 100 percent 
employment in a single industry. Wholesale is NAICS sec-
tor 42.
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margin. In constructing the interaction terms, 
we  subtract the sample mean from each vari-
able entering the interaction term. This nor-
malization ensures that the main effects of each 
variable can be interpreted as the effect at the 
sample mean.
Our choice of product and country charac-
teristics is motivated by the recent theoretical 
literature on contractual frictions and inter-
national trade. This literature emphasizes the 
relative importance of relationship specific 
investments by headquarters and supplier 
firms and the degree of contractibility of these 
investments. In Antràs (2003), capital inten-
sity captures the relative importance of head-
quarters’ investments, and hence we include 
industry capital intensity and country capital 
abundance. To allow for the possibility that 
other factor intensities matter, we also include 
industry skill intensity and country skill abun-
dance. In Antràs and Helpman (2004), head-
quarters investments are interpreted more 
broadly, and hence we include our direct mea-
sure of headquarters intensity discussed above. 
In Grossman and Helpman (2005), the degree 
of contractibility of relationship specific invest-
ments can vary with, for example, product and 
country characteristics, and hence we include 
revealed product contractibility and country 
governance as further independent variables. 
Finally, we explore the impact of policy based 
barriers by including measures of trade and 
FDI protection as country characteristics.
Table 1 reports the results of estimat-
ing specification (2). Columns 1 and 3 use the 
extensive margin as the dependent variable, so 
the sample comprises all product-country cells 
with positive imports, including those with zero 
intrafirm trade. Columns 2 and 4 focus on the 
intensive margin, and the sample is all obser-
vations with positive intrafirm trade. Columns 
3 and 4 control for the nonrandom selection of 
observations with positive intrafirm imports 
using the Heckman two-stage estimation proce-
dure. The two stages are separately identified by 
functional form and the excluded variable from 
the second-stage regression. For the excluded 
variable, we choose the cost of phone calls to 
the United States, which arguably affects the 
fixed costs of establishing an affiliate but not the 
relative variable costs of intrafirm versus arm’s 
length trade.8
Consistent with the recent theoretical literature 
on contractual frictions in international trade, 
we find in columns 1 and 2 that higher revealed 
product contractibility is associated with less 
intrafirm trade on both the extensive and inten-
sive margins. We also find that the sign on the 
quality of country governance changes between 
columns 1 and 2. Increases in governance qual-
ity raise the probability that foreign affiliates are 
present (column 1) but are associated with lower 
shares of intrafirm trade conditional on positive 
intrafirm trade occurring (column 2). This result 
suggests good governance promotes the estab-
lishment of related-party trade but not its inten-
sity once established, which is  consistent with 
the idea that arm’s length contracting is easier 
in countries with good governance. Similar 
 nonlinearities are present for population and 
FDI protection.
Results in Table 1 also indicate the relevance 
of interactions of product and country charac-
teristics in determining intrafirm trade. While 
the main effects for intermediation and coun-
try governance are both negative in column 4, 
the interaction term has a positive coefficient. 
That is, higher product intermediation (revealed 
contractibility) is associated with greater reduc-
tions in intrafirm trade as governance quality 
declines. Likewise, improved governance is 
8 The likelihood ratio test of rho = 0 yields a chi-
squared statistic of 26.21, rejecting the null of independent 
equations.
Figure 1. Intrafirm Import Intensity and “Revealed 
Contractibility” by Two-Digit HS Category, 1997
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Table 1—Determinants of Intra-Firm Imports, HS10-Country, 1997
Intra-firm 
trade dummy
Share of intra-
firm trade
Intra-firm
trade dummy
Share of intra-
firm trade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intermediation −0.715*** −0.165*** −0.719*** −0.235***
(0.050)  (0.019)  (0.050)  (0.025)
Governance  0.154*** −0.031***  0.103*** −0.031***
(0.014)  (0.007) (0.019)  (0.009)
 × Intermediation −0.058 0.084*** −0.056 0.090 ***
(0.039)  (0.015)  (0.039)  (0.017)
Capital intensity −0.005 0.059*** −0.005 0.056 ***
(0.021)  (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.008)
Log capital abundance 0.213***  0.067*** 0.173*** 0.068***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.017) (0.007)
 × Capital intensity 0.068*** 0.005 0.072*** 0.010**
(0.016)  (0.004) (0.015)  (0.005)
Skill intensity 1.336*** 0.196*** 1.348*** 0.324***
(0.192) (0.051) (0.192) (0.067)
Log human capital −0.105** −0.066*** −0.044 −0.059**
 abundance (0.044) (0.022) (0.046) (0.023)
 × Skill intensity −0.415 −1.063*** −0.460 −1.142***
(0.407) (0.152) (0.411) (0.174)
HQ intensity −0.103 0.043 −0.099 0.016
(0.196) (0.065) (0.196) (0.071)
Log population 0.152*** −0.034*** 0.145*** −0.033***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003)
FDI protection 0.13*** −0.017*** 0.154*** 0.039***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.014) (0.007)
Trade protection −0.098*** 0.017*** −0.092*** −0.023***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.005)
US phone call cost — — −0.050***
(0.003)
Inverse Mills ratio — — 0.150***
(0.029)
Sample Full Positive intra-
firm trade
Full Positive intra-
firm trade
Estimation Probit OLS Heckman 
first-stage
Heckman 
second-stage
R2 0.079
Observations 180,774 92,656 180,774 92,656
Note: In constructing the interaction terms, we subtract the sample mean from each variable 
entering the interaction term, so that the main effects of each variable can be interpreted as 
the effect at the sample mean. Columns 1 and 3 include all country-product pairs with positive 
imports. Columns 2 and 4 include country-product pairs with positive intrafirm trade. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the four-digit SIC level are reported below coefficient 
estimates.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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associated with less intrafirm trade, especially 
for goods with lower intermediation.9
As in Antràs (2003), industry capital inten-
sity and country capital abundance play a role 
in determining the share of intrafirm trade. The 
positive coefficient on the interaction between 
industry capital intensity and country capital 
abundance implies that intrafirm trade shares are 
high for capital intensive products coming from 
capital abundant countries. In contrast to previ-
ous work, we also find a role for industry skill 
intensity and country skill abundance. The main 
effects of industry skill intensity on intrafirm 
trade are positive for both the intensive and exten-
sive margins; the main effects of country human 
capital abundance are negative; and the estimated 
coefficients on the skill interaction terms are neg-
ative. Therefore, greater industry skill intensity 
increases the share of intrafirm trade and leads to 
larger increases in more skill scarce countries. In 
contrast, greater country skill abundance reduces 
the share of intrafirm trade, and leads to larger 
reductions in more skill intensive products.
III. Conclusions
The literature on firms and international trade 
has focused attention on issues of contracting 
and the boundaries of the firm. This research 
speaks to policy issues surrounding the growth 
of outsourcing, offshoring and international 
production networks.
Our results provide evidence on the role of 
country governance and product contractibility 
in determining intrafirm trade. We find evidence 
of selection: the decision to establish a foreign 
affiliate in a country differs from the choice of 
how much to source from the affiliate once it is 
established. While affiliates are more likely to 
be situated in countries that are larger and have 
better governance, once affiliates exist, the share 
of intrafirm trade is negatively related to both 
country size and country governance quality. Our 
results also highlight interactions between country 
and product characteristics—e.g., improvements 
in country governance matter most for products 
for which contracting is relatively difficult.
9 Bernard et al. (forthcoming) reports a wide range of 
robustness tests.
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